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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
injunction against it, thereby deciding whether the use of adjoining land
is lawful. It can be said then that persons often have the option of
rendering another's act lawful or unlawful, and courts which have held
laws, allowing such an option, to be invalid as a "delegation of legislative
power", seem to have overlooked this treatment. Thus, such courts are
subject to the argument that it is the legislature which has laid down
restrictions, to be imposed under certain circumstances, and the private
person's act is just a "circumstance" which brings a situation under the
law.
The courts which strike down the non-signer provision may be con-
cerned with the plight of the retailer whose price is fixed. But most
courts permit the legislature to fix prices, and the retailer is equally op-
pressed whether his price is subject to the whim of the legislature or of
someone else. A few courts hold that all men are free to set their own
price; the legislature is held to have practically no price-fixing power, and
thus none to delegate. If the courts are interested in the retailer's free-
dom, they should adopt this position, rather than the pretext that the
legislature has delegated its power to the manufacturer.
George Lincoln
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-JURISDICTION-DEGREE OF
BUSINESS ACTIVITY NECESSARY TO SUBJECT THE
FOREIGN CORPORATION TO JURISDICTION
Defendant, a New Jersey corporation, sold a machine of special design
to an Illinois partnership, which in turn loaned it to the plaintiff, a Georgia
resident. In the contract of sale, the defendant expressly warranted that
the machine would be capable of producing certain tubing. When it
failed to function properly, the defendant undertook to repair it at the
request of the plaintiff. In the course of this operation, defendant's repre-
sentatives came into Georgia. Under their supervision, expenses in excess
of $11,000 were incurred, and plaintiff paid this amount. In the plaintiff's
action for breach of warranty, based on doing business in Georgia, the
defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that
the defendant corporation had not been doing business in the State of
Georgia. The trial court entered judgment sustaining the plea and this
holding was affirmed in the court of appeals which ruled that the
defendant's activities did not constitute doing business in Georgia.
Lamex, Inc. v. Sterling Extruder Corporation, 109 Ga. App. 92, 135
S.E.2d 445 (1964).
CASE NOTES
The purpose of this case note is to determine to what extent a foreign
corporation may engage in a business activity within a state other than
its domicile, without subjecting itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of
that state. The scope of this inquiry is primarily limited to those states
which determine the question of jurisdiction according to the traditional
standard of doing business (Georgia is such a representative state). The
statutory expansion of this concept will be noted briefly to illustrate the
trend toward increasing the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over
foreign corporations.
It is generally recognized, in the field of corporation law, that the
term "doing business" has three separate meanings. The courts have
long recognized a distinction among the activity required for a business
(1) to qualify under the licensing and regulatory statutes of a state,1 (2)
to be brought within the state's power of taxation, 2 and (3) to be made
amenable to service of process. 3 It is commonly accepted that a lesser
degree of activity is required to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement
than for either licensing or taxation. 4
There is, however, no recognized standard which can be used to deter-
mine conclusively whether a foreign corporation is, in fact, doing busi-
ness.5 If anything approaching such a rule exists, it might be a statement
to the effect that the nature and extent of activity must be such as to
"warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the
1 The question of qualification commonly arises where the defendant resident raises
as a defense a state statute denying unlicensed fcreign corporations doing business
within the state access to the courts of the forum. The court must then determine
whether the corporation was, in fact, doing business in order to rule on the validity
of the defense. For qualification purposes, a foreign corporation is doing business
within a state when it transacts "some substantial part of its ordinary business therein."
Royal Insurance Co. v. All States Theaters, 242 Ala. 417, 422, 6 So. 2d 494, 497 (1942).
2 The general rule in this area appears to be thai: the power to tax will be upheld
where the foreign corporation has a sufficient ne:us or connection with the state.
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minne:;ota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
3 The nature and extent of business contemplated by licensing statutes is one thing;
However, "activities insufficient to make out the transaction of business within these
statutes may yet be sufficient to bring the corporation within the state so as to make
it amenable to process." Tauza v. Susquehana Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267, 115 N.E.
915, 917 (1917) (Cardozo, J.).
4 International Harvester Company of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914);
International Text Book Co. v. Tone, 220 N.Y. 313, 115 N.E. 914 (1917); Lamont v.
Moss Cigar Co., 218 Ill. App. 435 (1920); Hartstein v. Seidenbach's Inc., 129 Misc. 687,
222 N.Y.S. 404 (1927).
5 People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1917); Miller v.
Tulsa Petroleum Company, 117 F. Supp. 359 (M.D. Pa. 1953).
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local jurisdiction." 6 In the final analysis, then, each case must rest on
its own peculiar set of facts.7
Often a question is raised as to whether the corporate activity has
been repeatedly carried on within the forum. Where the answer is in
the affirmative, the courts have overwhelmingly sustained jurisdiction.8
Normally, in the absence of "single-act" jurisdictional statutes,9 an iso-
lated transaction will not be equated with the doing of business,10 but,
in certain jurisdictions, constituting a small minority, such a transaction
has been deemed sufficient to subject a foreign corporation to in per-
sonam jurisdiction." Other tests commonly applied to determine the
question of doing business include: the maintenance of offices or show-
rOoms;1 2 the, presence of agents or officers;13 and the performance of
services within the state.14
'Turning now to the Lamex case, it appears that the opinion of the
Georgia court was based upon authority which was improperly ap-
plied. The ourt relied heavily on 'the test used in Redwine v. United
States Tobacco Co., 5" disregarding the fact that this was a tax case,
6 people's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 5, at 87. Accord,
Erving v. Chicago & N.W.. 'Ry. 171 Minn. 87, 214 N.W. 12 (1927); Armstrong Co. v.
New York Cent. & H:R.R. Co., 129,Minn. 104, 151 N.W. 917 (1915); Scene-in-Action
Corp. v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 261 111. App. 153 (1931).
7 Faveil-Utley Realty Co. v. Harbor Plywood Corp., 94 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Cal.
1950); Atlas Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Portsceller, 43 Del. 298, 46 A.2d 643 (1945); Dobson
v. Maytag Sales Coro., 292 Mich. 107, 290 N.W. 346 (1940); J. R. Watkins Co. v.
Hamilton, 32 Ala. App. 361, 26 So. 2d 207 (1946).
8 Housing Authority v. Brown, 244 N.C. 592, 94 S.E.2d 582 (1956); Clay v. Kent Oil
Co., 72 S.D. 629, 38 N.W.2d.. 258 (1949); Halpin v. North American Refractories Co.,
151 Misc. 764, 272 N.Y.S. 393 (1934).
9 14 DEPAuL L. REV. 202 '(1964).
10Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956);
Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 339
U.S. 947 (1950); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 325 Mich. 699, 39 N.W.2d 341 (1949);
'Schultz v. Long Island Mach. & Equip. Co., 173 So. 569 (La.'App. 1937).
11 S. Howes Co., v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954), appeal dismissed
348 U.S. 983 (1955); Times Bldg. Co. for Use of Gray-Knox Marble Co. v. Cline, 233
Ala. 600, 173 So. 42 (1937); Harnischfeger Sales Corp.-v. Sternborg Co., 179 La. 317,
154 So. 10 (1934); State v. Gregory, 209 Wis. 476, 245 N.W. 194 (1932).
12 Dahl v. Collette, 202 Minn. 544, 279 N.W. 561 (1938); Swasey v. Knopf, 150 Misc.
541, 269 N.Y.S. 651 (1933).
13 Southeastern Distributing Co. v. Nordyke & Marmon Co., 159 Ga. 150, 125 S.E.
171 (1924); Taylor v. Fiiedman Co., 152 Ga. 529, 110 S.E. 679 (1922).
14 Boney v. Tians-State Dredging Co., 237 S.C. 54, 115 S.E.2d 508 (1960); Malooly
v. York Heating & Ventilating Corp', 270 Mich. 240, 258 N.W. 622 (1935).
15 209 Ga. 725, 75 S.E.2d 556 (1953). In this case, the Georgia Supreme Court held
that promotional activities by a foreign corporation did not constitute doing busi-
ness within the forum as the activity was not engaged in with the prospect or pur-
pose of making a profit.
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necessitating a greater degree of business activity for a jurisdictional
basis than that required to make a foreign corporation subject to ordinary
process.'"
The same lack of discernment colored the court's reliance on the
case of York Mfg. Co. v. Colley,17 which involved a question of licensing.
Here, a contract made in interstate commerce provided for the shipment
to a Texas buyer of an ice plant which was to be assembled at buyer's
expense under the supervision of an expert furnished by seller. When a
controversy arose over the contract, the defendant buyer contended that
the installation aspect was intrastate in character, and therefore precluded
the plaintiff from maintaining a cause of action since it was not licensed
to do business within the state. The Supreme Court rejected the defend-
ant's contenton, holding that, as the contract was indivisible and made
in interstate commerce, plaintiff was not :required to be licensed in the
State of Texas. The Georgia court, in relying on this case, ignored the
fact that, though the matter to be considered concerns questions of li-
censing, in the determination of jurisdiction, licensing is of scant con-
cern.1s
Considering the case of Georgia Lumber & Veneer Corp. v. Solem
Machine Co.,19 the court of appeals assurmed the facts were analagous
to Lamex, but a 'close examination shows that this assumption was er-
roneous.20 A marked difference between the fact situation is present,
in that (1) the repair service furnished in the Solem case was done merely
as an accommodation, and (2) no local expense was incurred by the repair-
man. Furthermore, this case also relies upon the test set forth in the
Redwine Case,2 ' thus using a tax standard in a matter concerned solely
with jurisdiction.
The Lamex decision was not based upon the "isolated transaction"
test,2 2 which, if it be conceded that the defendant was involved in Georgia
in but one isolated transaction, would have constituted justification for
the holding of the court of appeals. Rather, the court chose to follow
16 Supra note 4. 17 247 U.S. 21 (1918).
18 It has long been recognized that even where the business carried on by a corpora-
tion is entirely interstate in character, this factor will not render the corporation
immune from the ordinary process of the courts of the state. International Harvester
Company of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
19-150 F. Supp. 126 (M.D. Ga. 1957).
20 Ibid. In this case the extent of defendant's activity was: (1) starting a sanding
machine which defendant had been sold to plaintiff who installed it; (2) demonstrat-
ing its operation to plaintiff's employees; (3) inspecting the initial operation; and (4)
providing service and repair for a nominal charge. The service activity amounted to
approximately sixteen work days over a one year period.
21 Supra note 15. 22 Supra note 10.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Allied Finance Co. v. Prosser,23 a case that blatantly overlooked decisions
which held that single transactions were sufficient to constitute doing
business.2 4 In relying upon the "isolated transaction" test the Georgia
court clearly lags behind current thought on this matter. As a result,
the status of the law in Georgia more closely resembles the "rigid" rule
set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff, 25 than the more flexible standard enun-
ciated in International Shoe Company v. State of Washington,26 which
expanded the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants.2 7
In Illinois, the yardstick of International Shoe, announced by the
Supreme Court,28 was adopted by the General Assembly in its revision
of the Civil Practice Act in 1955,29 and among other things, provided
that one is subject to service for a cause of action arising from the
transaction of any business within the state.30 The constitutionality of
this amended provision was sustained two years later, and it was recog-
nized then that the state had a legitimate interest in "providing redress
in its courts against persons, who, having substantial contacts with the
state, incure obligations to those entitled to the state's protection."31
Furthermore, in recent decisions the state's requirements for jurisdiction
have been further relaxed so as to permit maximum application of the
"minimum contact" rule set forth in International Shoe.32
The facts in the present case tend to show that the business activity
of the defendant constituted far more than an isolated transaction or
"single-act". It is true that under the original sales contract the defendant
23 103 Ga. App. 538, 119 S.E.2d 813 (1961).
24 Id. at 541, 119 S.E.2d at 816. In this case the Georgia court denied service of process
holding: "We can find no case where the courts have stretched the term doing busi-
ness to include a single transaction entered into by an individual." Contra, see supra
note 11.
25 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In this decision, the Supreme Court equated in personam juris-
diction to physical power over the defendant.
26 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In this landmark case on the subject it was held: "... due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he has certain minimum con-
tacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.' "
27 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
28 Supra note 26.
29 Berlemann v. Superior Distributing Co., 17 111. App. 2d 522, 151 N.E.2d 116 (1958).
This case discussed the legislative intent for the amendment and cited International
Shoe Company v. Washington, supra note 21.
3 0 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1963).
31 Nelson v. Miller, 11111. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
32 Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 I11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961);
Hertz Corp. v. Taylor, 15 111. 2d 552, 155 N.E.2d 610 (1959).
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was bound to make the adjustments necessary to produce a workable
installation. However, nothing in this provision required that the defend-
ant purchase material within the state, supervise and direct local per-
sonnel, and utilize local plants in the undertaking.
The expense incurred by the defendant was the result of its continuous
and regular activity in connection with several subsidiary contracts
executed with local business concerns, and this activity would seem to
be of sufficient extent so as to make the defendant amenable to process.
33
Accordingly, it would appear that there was little basis here for appli-
cation of the "single-transaction" test, and it seems that in selecting the
standard that it did here, the Georgia court gave clear notice that it
has not yet chosen to seek a broad basis of jurisdiction over foreign
corporations.
Michael Toomin
33 "To the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The exer-
cise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise
out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires
the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue." International Shoe Company v. Washington, supra note
26, at 319.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-TORTS-INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY:
PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE BAR?
The plaintiff was a passenger in an auto driven by her husband at the
time an accident occurred between the husband's vehicle and another.
The wife brought suit for personal injuries sustained in the accident against
the special administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, who died
prior to the commencement of the action. The issue, thus presented, is
can an injured wife maintain a tort action against her husband's estate
for a negligent act committed by the deceased husband during cover-
ture? The trial court held that such an action can be maintained. On ap-
peal that decision was affirmed. Poepping v. Lindemann, 128 N.W.2d
512 (Minn. 1964).
Minnesota does not allow a personal action between husband and wife
for an injury occurring during coverture. 1 May the fact that the tort-
feasor husband is demised give rise to a cause of action where none is
permitted between living spouses? Under Minnesota's abatement and
survival acts,2 a cause of action arising out of bodily injuries or death
I Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (020).
2 MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 573, S.01 (1947).
